Objective: Explore incremental ways of bringing current institutions closer to free market institutions. Survey pragmatic uses of free market environmentalism that do not require massive institutional changes.
Chapter 13: Purity vs. Pragmatism
Supplemental Readings:
Fitzgerald, Tim. 2000. Federal Land Exchanges: Let?s End the Barter. PERC Policy Series, PS-18. Bozeman, MT: PERC, June. Online: HERE
Fitzgerald finds the barter system highly inefficient for land exchanges. It hinders many exchanges from happening that would otherwise occur if simple cash arrangements were used.
Fretwell, Holly Lippke. 1999. Paying to Play: The Fee Demonstration Program. PERC Policy Series, PS-17. Bozeman, MT: PERC, December. Online: HERE
Fretwell documents the success of the fee demonstration program for federal agencies, including the national park system. She offers a few suggestions for improving the user fees program.
Fujita, Rodney M., D. Douglas Hopkins, and W. R. Zach Willey. 1996. Creating Incentives to Curb Overfishing. Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy 11(2): 29?35. Online: http://www.environmentaldefense.org/
These authors from Environmental Defense advocate ITQs for fisheries management to ensure the long-term sustainability of fisheries.
Getz, Wayne M., Louise Fortmann, David Cumming, Johan du Toit, Jodi Hilty, Rowan Martin, Michael Murphree, Norman Owen-Smith, Anthony M. Starfield, and Michael I. Westphal. 1999. Sustaining Natural and Human Capital: Villagers and Scientists. Science 283(5409): 1855.
This short article from Science magazine explores the success of community run programs in Africa for maintaining wildlife populations, primarily elephants.
Grewell, J. Bishop, and Clint Peck. 1999. Greenbacks for Bucks. Montana Farmer-Stockman, December.
In this short article, Grewell and Peck explain ranching for wildlife and look at the possibility of implementing ranching for wildlife in a state without it.
James, Alexander, Sam Kanyamibwa, and Michael J. B. Green. 2001. Sustainable Financing for Protected Areas in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. In The Politics and Economics of Park Management. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 69?87.
James et. al. survey how the revenue streams created by parastatal agencies (agencies receiving some government funding and some from outside resources) create better incentives for environmental management of parks.
Schiller, Erin. 1998. The Oregon Water Trust. Private Conservation Case Study. Washington DC: Center for Private Conservation, November. Online: http://www.cei.org/CPCCaseReader.asp?ID=358
Schiller provides background on an environmental group in Oregon that uses water markets to protect fish by purchasing instream flows.
Schoenbrod, David. 1997. Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards. In Environmental Federalism, ed. Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill. Lanham, MD; Rowman $& Littlefield, 259-70.
Schoenbrod presents the argument for environmental federalism in pollution control.
Stalling, David. 1999. Public Elk, Private Lands: Should Landowners Benefit from Elk and Elk Hunting. Bugle, January-February.
Stalling examines the controversies and the benefits of Colorado?s Ranching for Wildlife program where private landowners are encouraged to steward habitat in return for transferable hunting permits.