The Price We Pay
Introduction
Our nation’s federal land management agencies fail to meet any reasonable standard of fiscal responsibility, making the public foot the bill with hundreds of millions of tax dollars. Twenty percent of the nation’s land area (456 million acres) is controlled by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. This federal estate encompasses a wealth of forests, grazing lands, minerals, wildlife, and recreational amenities with enormous potential to generate revenues for the public good. Yet from 1994 through 1996 these agencies lost an average of $290 million on timber, $66 million on grazing, and $355 million on recreation.1
As federal land management agencies continue to lose money, state land management agencies are controlling costs and generating revenues from trust lands. They too sell timber, lease grazing land and collect recreational fees, but unlike our federal agencies they earn a profit.2 Between 1994 and 1996, ten western states earned a combined average of $5.56 for every dollar spent managing state trust lands.3 Compare this to the $0.30 earned per every dollar spent by the Forest Service and $0.94 earned per dollar spent by the BLM (see Table 1).4
Not only do the federal land agencies earn far less than the state agencies, they outspend the states on a per-acre basis by a wide margin. The Forest Service spends more than five times what the states spend and the BLM spends nearly twice what the states do (see Figure 1).
Note: 1994-96 average, in 1996 dollars. State Trust figures are based on the average figures for state-managed lands, including: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington.
Sources: BLMD and FSD as cited in note 1; STLD as cited in note 3.
What do our federal land managers spend their billion-dollar budgets on, and why are they unable to at least cover their costs given the extraordinary wealth of resources that they manage? Why are the state land management agencies able to generate a profit while our federal land management agencies lose hundreds of millions of dollars? A financial analysis of the Forest Service and the BLM can help answer these questions, but a lack of fiscal accountability makes such a simple analysis a nightmare in data collection and tabulation.5
Time and again, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has criticized the reliability and accounting of Forest Service budgeting practices (GAO 1998b, 1). In FY 1995, for example, the Forest Service could not account for $215 million of its $3.4 billion operating budget (GAO 1998a, 5). Neither the Forest Service nor the BLM can give a consistently accurate accounting of its spending because accounting procedures do not track actual expenditures by activity, but only budgeted expenses. Planned expenditures do not always reflect actual spending.6
On the revenue side accounting practices are in equal disarray. Reports of total receipts are often incomplete or even missing.7 The GAO reports that the Forest Service does not have a complete inventory of its capital assets or know the value of these assets (GAO 1998b, 3). The agency does not know the deferred maintenance requirements for its roads, buildings, and campgrounds, which could amount to several billion dollars. In this data vacuum, our analysis uses the best available cash flow figures as provided by the agencies.
Some telling differences appear when federal and state land agencies are compared. The Forest Service and BLM rely on Congress for their budgets and turn over revenues to the general treasury.8 With no connection between money spent and money earned, efforts to encourage financial responsibility are futile. Managers have little incentive to generate more revenues because they cannot be retained by the agency. How then do they get more money? Seeking budget increases is the only way.
Another disincentive has been the “use it or lose it” budgeting system which has discouraged managers from cutting costs. In the past, if agencies did not use all budgeted money by the end of the fiscal year, managers would race to spend the money as fast as possible. Unspent money was usually returned to the regional or Washington office rather than retained by the local unit for use the next year. This discouraged thoughts of cost cutting. The Forest Service has recently abandoned the “use it or lose it” system in favor of one that allows it to carry over budgeted money from one year to the next.9 Eliminating this incentive to spend every cent in the budget should benefit the taxpayer.
In contrast, state lands have incentives more like private companies where the bottom line matters. Unlike federal lands, state trust lands must generate revenues for the public schools and other trust beneficiaries.10 State trust land expenditures are funded from revenues generated by the lands or from state general funds. In either case, there is a connection between expenditures and revenues because state trust lands have beneficiaries, similar to shareholders, who have a claim on “profits.” These beneficiaries, including parents, teachers, and school administrators, become the self-appointed watchdogs for the state land agencies. This direct connection between earnings and beneficiaries makes fiscal reporting by state land agencies more accurate.
Federal land agencies are losers in part because they are so inefficient. One obvious reason for higher federal costs is the number of agency employees per acre of land managed. In this comparison, the Forest Service comes out at the bottom of the heap. Both the BLM and the states have about 40 employees per million acres, while the Forest Service has 200 employees per million acres.
Neither federal agency can match the states’ performance when revenues per employee are considered. The states earn annual revenues of about $425,000 per full-time employee, while the BLM earns close to $110,000 per employee and the Forest Service earns less than $24,000 per employee.
Dissecting the agencies by activity further demonstrates the ineptness of federal land management. The Forest Service, BLM, and state trust lands all provide for multiple land use including timber, minerals, grazing, and recreation. The following use-by-use comparison shows that the state trust lands provide a greater net return than the federal land agencies.
Federal timber receipts, which generate the most surface land revenues, are depleted by disproportionately high expenditures. A comparison with the four major state trust land timber producers (Washington, Oregon, Montana and Idaho) shows that the state trust lands generate significant net revenues from their timber activities,11 while the BLM and Forest Service generate significant net losses (see Table 2).
Financial losses from federal timber sales are often assumed to be the result of low-valued timber, but a closer look reveals that the losses are more accurately attributed to high management costs and a failure to maximize timber revenues.12
Differences in timber management costs between state and federal agencies are startling. From 1994 to 1996, the states spent an average $69 per thousand board feet (mbf) of harvested timber, while the Forest Service spent an average of $246 and the BLM spent $587 per mbf. On the BLM’s highly productive Oregon and California Grant Lands (O&C), the agency spent an average of $656 per mbf (see Figure 2).
Note: 1994-96 average, in 1996 dollars.
Sources: BLMD as cited in note 1; STLD as cited in note 3; TSTLD as cited in note 11; Warren (1997, 21).
In sharp contrast, the Oregon state lands dedicated to the Common School Fund (CSF) spent only $208 per mbf.13 If the BLM had the same mbf cost as the state, potential savings would be $65.5 million annually. Another example is in Montana where the Forest Service spent an average of $35 more per mbf than the state, suggesting potential savings of $11.3 million annually (see Figure 3).14
Note: 1994-96 average, in 1996 dollars.
Sources: MTRD as cited in note 16; MTCD as cited in note 14; STLD as cited in note 3. TSTLD as cited in note 11.
In addition to lower costs, timber harvested from state trust lands generates greater revenues than timber from federal lands.15 In western Oregon, for example (see Figure 2), BLM revenues of $340 per mbf are less than half the $700 per mbf earned by the Oregon CSF. The potential revenues missed by the BLM could be as much as $54.2 million annually. Similarly, national forests in Montana earn only $213 per mbf, whereas state forests earn $381 per mbf (see Figure 3). If national forests were run as efficiently as Montana state forests, Forest Service revenues could amount to an additional $54.5 million.16
Salvage timber in central Washington near Wenatchee provides another example of missed federal revenues. In 1994, summer wildfires destroyed 185,000 acres of adjacent federal and state timberlands. Because burned timber declines rapidly in value, it was imperative to salvage the timber as quickly as possible. The salvage timber on state land was sold at an average price of $203 per mbf the following spring. The Forest Service timber, which was not up for sale until late summer, had declined in value and sold for only $8 to $94 per mbf (GAO 1996, 11).
Grazing is another activity that results in a huge loss for federal taxpayers. From 1994 to 1996, the Forest Service and BLM generated just over $0.25 for every dollar spent on rangeland management. State trust lands earned an average of $7.06 per dollar spent17 (see Table 3).
High costs by the Forest Service and BLM are again the culprit. The states spend less than $1 per animal unit month (AUM),18 but the federal land managers spend closer to $5 (see figure 4).19 The federal agencies require about 78 full-time equivalent employees (FTE) per million AUMs compared to the states, which average 20 FTE per million AUMs. At the same time, the federal return is less than $2 per AUM while the average state return is more than $6 per AUM.
Note: 1994-96 average, in 1996 dollars. State Trust figures are based on the average figures for state-managed lands, including: Arizona, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, and Oregon. Idaho data was provided for 1995 and 1996 only, costs include all surface management.
Sources:AUMD as cited in note 19; BMLD and FSD as cited in note 1. GSTLD as cited in note 17; STLD as cited in note 3.
To enhance revenues, some states are experimenting with alternative, non-grazing uses for trust lands. The first non-grazing lease was awarded in New Mexico in the fall of 1996. The Forest Guardians, an environmental group, outbid a rancher for a 644-acre riparian area. The state trust now receives not only greater revenues from the new lessee, but willows and other cover have been planted along damaged stream banks. Alternative uses of rangelands allows land managers to derive revenues from the highest valued land use. Legislation prohibits the Forest Service and BLM from non-grazing use of federal rangelands.
Minerals are the only commodity from federal lands that generate a positive return.20 From 1994 to 1996, mineral production earned more than $6 for every $1 spent on mineral management (see Table 4). While these appear to be substantial earnings compared to timber and grazing, they are a fraction of what the states earn from minerals. For example, the average return from mineral production in nine states was $35 per dollar of expenditure.21
Comparing state and federal land agency expenses for mineral management is tricky. Many states assign duties such as enforcement of environmental regulations and reclamation rules, bond requirements, and on-site inspection to other state offices, thus making mineral management costs for the land agencies appear artificially low. For New Mexico and Wyoming, our largest mineral producers, it is possible to draw a comparison with federal land agencies because the GAO has gathered data that include all expenses.22 The numbers show that these states earn more than twice what the federal government earns on mineral production, with New Mexico generating a return of $16.03 for every dollar spent and Wyoming earning $12.14.23
Recreation loses more money than any other activity on federal lands including timber sales and federal grazing (see Figure 5). Of all federal land users, recreationists receive by far the largest federal subsidy, amounting to an average of $355 million each year from 1994 to 1996 for hunters, hikers, campers and other recreationists (see Table 5).
Earnings from recreation totaled just pennies for every dollar spent on management by the Forest Service and BLM, even though recreation visitor days (RVDs)24 rose 51 percent from 1981-1984 to 1994-1996.25 In light of the steadily rising demand for recreation on public land, these poor earnings are a clear indication that recreationists do not pay their way.
Note: 1994-96 average, in 1996 dollars. Costs for recreation on Montana State Trust lands includes program costs for recreation use, rights-of-way, cabin leases, and outfitter licenses.
Sources: BLMD and FSD as cited in note 1; STLD as cited in note 3.
The potential to generate revenues from recreation on federal lands is largely untapped. The Forest Service and BLM offer recreation users 140,000 miles of hiking trails, 6.4 million acres of lakes and reservoirs, and more than 24,000 developed recreation sites. In 1996, the agencies collected fees from just 4,200 sites, mostly for overnight camping,26 and the bulk of these fees were returned to the treasury.
Despite this potential, federal lands lose money because recreation visitor costs greatly exceed visitor receipts. The Forest Service spends $1.07 per RVD and earns just $0.14. In the case of the BLM, costs are $0.68 per RVD and agency earnings amount to $0.04 per RVD (Figure 6).
Note: 1994-96 average, in 1996 dollars.
Sources: BLMD and FSD as cited in note 1; RVDD as cited in note 25.
In contrast, a growing number of states are capitalizing on recreation demand on trust lands. Montana, for example, charges an annual recreation fee of $10 per person. In 1996, the state earned more than $1.10 for every dollar spent on recreation, adding $57,000 to its budget. Other states are just beginning to charge recreation fees, and to earn money from game and wildlife easements.
There is hope that federal land agencies will begin to earn more from recreation. In 1996, Congress created the Recreational Fee Demonstration Program. The program allows 100 sites in each of the federal land management agencies to keep 80 percent27 of their fee receipts to be used for site improvements. In FY 1997, the Forest Service generated revenues of $8.7 million in addition to all previously collected receipts from just 40 participating units. That same year, the BLM collected revenues of $419,000 (USDI and USDA 1998, 3-4) from 10 participating units. So far the program appears to be a success with both the management agencies and with the public who must pay the new fees. Final decisions about user fees will be made at the end of the four-year project.
Although federal land managers claim they have shifted their focus from commodity production to recreation and environmental management, the numbers belie any such change. The Forest Service and the BLM have not adjusted their budgets to reflect the dramatic increase in recreation and the corresponding steady decline in timber and grazing.
On average, timber production declined 69 percent and livestock grazing declined 16 percent from 1981-84 to 1994-96 (see Table 6).
But Forest Service spending has not followed suit (see Figure 7), and the portion of the budget spent on timber production increased 10 percent (see Table 7). At the same time, the share of the budget for recreation increased only 3 percent, and expenditures for other land resources, including ecosystem planning, wildlife and water, rose only 2 percent.28 The fastest growing segment of the Forest Service budget is general administration, increasing from 19 percent of total expenditures in 1992 to 32 percent in 1996 (Smith 1998, 4).
Sources: Annual Report (Forest Service 1994-1996) timber offered, sold, and harvested; FSD as cited in note 1.
While the rhetoric coming from the federal land agencies acknowledges the expanding importance of recreational amenities and environmental protection and their impact on how our public lands are managed, so far it is just that–rhetoric.
Our federal land agencies squander hundreds of millions of dollars in public resources every year. The current system of funding Forest Service and BLM budgets by Congress and returning their earned revenues to the general treasury fails to foster fiscal responsibility. These agencies have become a burden to every taxpayer, when they should be a rich source of revenues to benefit the public. State land management agencies have shown that fiscal responsibility is not an impossible goal for government. They consistently earn money from state trust lands, while federal agencies lose money. Because their mission is to generate revenues for public education, their efforts are closely watched by interest groups such as parents and teachers. With this incentive, they control costs, seek innovative ways to generate new revenues, and fulfill their mission to school children.
If federal land managers had to fund their operations out of revenues, red ink would vanish. Eliminating the congressional budget dole would provide a badly needed incentive to minimize costs and generate new revenues. The Fee Demonstration Program has already shown us that incentives really do matter. Given the ability to charge fees and retain revenues, managers could actually manage their lands, rather than respond to the political whims of Congress. If lands were allocated to their highest valued uses, we could have more elk habitat in some areas and more livestock forage in others, or more recreation in some national forests and more timber harvesting in others. It could mean more fishing access and riparian regeneration. The uses need not be mutually exclusive.
With the right incentives our federal land management agencies could be a source of wealth to all Americans, not the burden that we have allowed them to become.
1. In this document, the following data sources shall be referred to as BLMD: BLM expenditure data are from Budget Justifications (BLM 1996-1998); BLM receipts data are from Public Land Statistics (BLM 1996 and 1997) statement of receipts by source; onshore minerals costs and receipts are from Minerals Management Service (1994-1996); telephone and written communication with Bob Prael, Chief, Royalty-in-Kind Section, Financial Branch, Royalty Management Program, Mineral Management Service, Denver; and telephone and written communication with Alice Sonne, BLM Accountant, Denver.
The following data sources shall be hereinafter referred to as FSD: Forest Service expenditures and receipts are from the Report of the Forest Service (Forest Service 1995-1997) statement of obligations, National Forest System funding, and statement of receipts; and Budget Explanatory Notes (Forest Service 1998, 180, 196).
2. Analysis is cash flow and does not include the value of assets or depreciation.
3. In this document, the following data sources shall be referred to as STLD: Arizona State Land Department (1993-1996); Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners (1993-1996); telephone and written communication with Beth Ann Christensen, Accountant, Idaho Department of Lands, Boise; Montana Department of Natural Resources (1994-1996) and telephone and written communication with Lorraine Shepard, Administrative Officer, Helena; Nebraska Board of Educational Lands and Funds (1992-1996) and telephone and written communication with Cindy Kehling, Executive Assistant, Lincoln; New Mexico State Land Office (1994-1996); telephone and written communication with Faye Pitts, Accountant, Oregon Division of State Lands, Salem; South Dakota Office of the Commissioner (1996) and telephone and written communication with Linda Hodgin, Land Sales Agent, Pierre; Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands (1994-1996); Washington Department of Natural Resources (1994-1996).
4. The BLM alone has a return of only $.12 for every dollar spent. However, while the BLM is responsible for management of all minerals on all federal lands, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) provides for revenue collection and disbursement of all producing mineral sites. MMS onshore expenses and receipts have therefore been included with BLM totals.
5. Because neither the Forest Service nor the BLM publishes actual expenditures and revenues by activity, data have been accumulated from a variety of sources as cited in note 1. In addition, the following Forest Service personnel provided valuable assistance (via written and telephone communication) in defining and obtaining Forest Service data: Lynn Johnson, Budget Officer, Gallatin National Forest, Bozeman, Montana; Steve Sherwood, Staff Specialist, Washington, D.C.; Rick Ullrich, Branch Manager, Program Planning and Budget, Washington, D.C. Assistance interpreting BLM data (via written and telephone communication) was received from Gordon Hanson, Legislative Affairs Group, Information Officer, Washington, D.C., and Alice Sonne, BLM Accounting, Denver. Even so, the inconsistent nature of Forest Service and BLM accounting systems lead to continual questions on data validity and the need to supplement the data with more precise estimations. As such, the data provided herein is the best available as of June 10, 1998.
6. For this reason average data for the three-year period between 1994 and 1996 has been used when possible to compensate for carry-over funds and unpaid obligations.
7. For example, see Public Land Statistics (BLM 1996, table 3-23), statement of receipts by source. The total revenues reported do not include 15 percent of recreation fee collections, communication sites, mining law fees, oil and gas collections and perhaps other accounts unreported by BLM staff.
8. There are some exceptions to this rule. For example, only 15 percent of most recreation fees remained with the agency to cover fee collection costs. Another example is the Knutson-Vandenberg (K-V) fund of the Forest Service. A portion of timber receipts remains with the division to cover the costs of regeneration. Additionally, both the BLM and Forest Service retain about half of grazing fees for rangeland improvements. Despite these and other retained funds, the Forest Service retains only about 14 percent of its operating budget, and the BLM a mere 7 percent.
9. New appropriations language for the Forest Service FY 1998 budget allows for unexpended funds to carry over until expended.
10. Trust beneficiaries include the common public schools, legislative, executive, and judicial buildings, state hospitals, penitentiaries, agricultural colleges, military institutions, universities, and schools for the deaf and blind.
11. STLD as cited in note 3. In this document, the following data sources shall be referred to as TSTLD: written and telephone communication with Bob Burke, Scaling Supervisor, Idaho Department of Lands, Boise; written and telephone communication with Pat Flowers, Bureau Chief, Forest Management, Montana Trust Lands Division, Helena; and written and telephone communication with Dan Korgan, Business Section, Oregon Division of State Lands, Salem.
12. See also Leal (1995).
13. Oregon Common School Fund Forest lands are trust lands administered by the Oregon Department of Forestry for the Division of State Lands, Land Board.
14. In this document, the following data sources shall be referred to as MTCD: Statement of Obligations, Forest Service Region 1, Helena. Montana National Forest data includes the Clearwater and Nez Pierce national forests in Idaho.
15. Data used is total timber payment including road credits, brush disposal and slash fees. Timber receipts from both federal agencies and trust lands come from competitive bid. See Johnson (1979) for comparison of bid type.
16. See Jackson (1987) for differences in timber stumpage price on state and Forest Service lands in Montana. In this document, the following data sources shall be referred to as MTRD: Annual Collections Statements, Forest Service Region 1, Helena.
17. STLD as cited in note 3. In this document, the following data sources shall be referred to as GSTLD: written and telephone communication with Steven Williams, Arizona State Land Department, Range Section Manager, Phoenix; written and telephone communication with Tracy Burns, Idaho Department of Lands, Range Management Specialist, Boise; written and telephone communication with Kevin Chappel, Montana Trust Lands Management Division, Agricultural and Grazing Bureau Chief, Helena; written and telephone communication with Mike Brand, Surface Division Director, North Dakota State Land Department, Bismarck; written and telephone communication with Jeff Kroft, Oregon Division of State Lands, Policy Development Specialist, Policy and Planning Section, Salem.
18. An AUM is the amount of forage needed for one animal unit–one cow and calf, one horse, or five sheep or goats–for one month.
19. In this document, the following data sources shall be referred to as AUMD: Public Land Statistics, (BLM 1994/95 and 1996) summary of authorized use of grazing district lands; Annual Report (Forest Service 1994-1996) annual grazing statistics.
20. Federal minerals include only onshore minerals on all federal lands. Total costs and revenues are as reported by the Forest Service, BLM, and MMS.
21. STLD as cited in note 3. In this document, the following data sources shall be referred to as MSTLD: written and telephone communication with Lynn Larson, Arizona State Land Department, Director of Administrative Division, Phoenix; written and telephone communication with Larry Kehoe, New Mexico State Land Office, Assistant Commissioner, Santa Fe; written and telephone communication with Cathy Borrego, New Mexico State Land Office, Human Resources, Santa Fe; written and telephone communication with Rick Larson, Director, Minerals Management Division, North Dakota State Land Department, Bismarck; written and telephone communication with Bryce Healy, South Dakota Office of the Commissioner of School and Public Lands, Deputy Commissioner, Pierre; written and telephone communication with Ed Bonner, Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, Minerals Specialist, Salt Lake City; and GAO (1997, 5, 16, 19).
22. GAO estimates include costs from the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division of the Department of Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources and Wyoming’s Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.
23. The GAO (1997, 5) study found state and federal minerals program costs to be uncomparable because of differences among the programs; however state land officials disagreed with that statement.
24. An RVD is 12 hours of visitation accumulated by one person or a combination of people. Visit figures are best estimates based on use surveys and trend extrapolation. Similar estimation techniques are not necessarily used across units.
25. In this document, the following data sources shall be referred to as RVDD: Public Land Statistics (BLM 1984 and 1994-1996) estimated recreational use of public lands; Annual Report (Forest Service 1994-1996) state summary of total recreation use; National Audubon (1986, 42).
26. The BLM collected recreation fees from 210 units in 1996 and the Forest Service from 3,985 units of which 2,685 were campgrounds per Greg Super, Recreation, Heritage and Wilderness Resources, U.S. Forest Service, Washington, D.C.
27. Initially the act allowed only 80 percent of revenues above a 1994 collections base which included a 4 percent annual increase to be retained by the collecting unit; the remainder was deposited into the treasury. The Interior Appropriations Act for FY 1998 removed the base year requirement allowing 80 percent of user fee receipts in participating units to remain for unit expenditures. The remaining 20 percent is available for expenditure by the land management agency.
28. National Audubon (1986, 35); BLMD and FSD as cited in note 1.
Arizona State Land Department. Various years. Annual Report. Phoenix.
Bureau of Land Management (BLM). 1996-1998. Budget Justifications. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior.
——. Various years. Public Land Statistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior.
——. Various years. Public Land Statistics Timber Sales and Special Forest Products Reports. Denver: U.S. Department of the Interior.
Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners. Various years. Annual Report. Denver.
Forest Service. 1998. FY 1998 Budget Explanatory Notes for the Committee on Appropriations. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture.
——. Various years. Report of the Forest Service. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture.
GAO. 1996. Public Timber: Federal and State Programs Differ Significantly in the Pacific Northwest. Report of the Chairman, Committee on Resources, U.S. House of Representatives. GAO/RCED-96-108.——. 1997. Minerals Management: Costs for Onshore Minerals Leasing Programs in Three States. GAO/RCED-97-31.——. 1998a. Forest Service: Lack of Financial and Performance Accountability has Resulted in Inefficiency and Waste. GAO/T-RCED/ALMD-98-135.
——. 1998b. Forest Service: Status of Progress Toward Financial Accountability. GAO/AIMD-98-84.
Idaho Department of Lands. Various years. Annual Report. Boise.
Jackson, David H. 1987. Why Stumpage Prices Differ between Ownerships: A Statistical Examination of State and Forest Service Sales in Montana. Forest Ecology and Management 18: 219-36.
Johnson, Ronald N. 1979. Oral Auction vs. Sealed Bids: An Empirical Investigation. Natural Resources Journal 19: 315-36.
Leal, Donald R. 1995. Turning A Profit on Public Forests. PERC Policy Series, PS-4. Bozeman, MT: Political Economy Research Center.
Minerals Management Service. Various years. Minerals Revenues. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior.
Montana Department of Natural Resources. Various years. Annual Report. Trust Land Division, Helena.
National Audubon Society. 1986. Wildlife Report. New York.
Nebraska Board of Educational Lands and Funds. Various years. Biennial Report. Lincoln.
New Mexico State Land Office. Various years. This Place in Time: Building Partnerships for the 21st Century. Santa Fe.
Smith, Robert, F. 1998. Statement. Hearing to Review the Forest Service Timber Sale Program. Chairman, Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives. Photocopy, June 11.
South Dakota Office of the Commissioner of School and Public Lands. 1996. Annual Report. Pierre.
U.S. Department of the Interior (USDI) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 1998. Recreational Fee Demonstration Program: Progress Report to Congress. Vol. 1, Overview and Summary. Washington, DC: National Park Service, Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and Fish and Wildlife Service.
Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration. Various years. Annual Report. Salt Lake City.
Warren, Debra D. 1998. Production, Prices, Employment, and Trade in Northwest Forest Industries: Second Quarter 1997. Resource Bulletin PNW-RB-202. Portland, OR: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station.
Washington Department of Natural Resources. Various years. Annual Report. Olympia.
